From the banks of the Yangtze River to the shores of the Caribbean, a strong economic and geopolitical bond has connected China and Venezuela for over two decades. Despite the severe economic and political crisis hitting the country, coupled with increasing international pressure, particularly from the United States, the question remains: why does Chinese President Xi Jinping continue to staunchly support Nicolás Maduro’s regime?
To grasp this complex relationship, it’s essential to delve into its historical background, analyze the underlying reasons, evaluate the geopolitical significance for China, break down its interests, and ultimately weigh the real possibility of abandonment.
A Bond Forged in Oil and Anti-Hegemonic Ideology
The relationship between China and Venezuela reached a turning point with Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in 1999. Seeking to diversify his country’s alliances beyond traditional U.S. influence, Chávez found in China a willing partner eager to invest and challenge the unipolar world order. While diplomatic ties were established in 1974, it was after the 2000s that economic cooperation flourished.
The establishment of the China-Venezuela High-Level Joint Commission in 2001 laid the groundwork for a strategic collaboration, especially in the energy sector. The flow of Venezuelan oil to China skyrocketed, increasing from 90,000 barrels per day in 2005 to 344,000 in 2014. This boom was solidified with the creation of the China-Venezuela Joint Fund (FCCV) in 2007, a mechanism for collateralized loans secured by oil sales, managed by the China Development Bank (CDB) and FONDEN.
Between 2007 and 2017, China’s bilateral financing to Venezuela reached an astounding figure of $62.1 billion, covering everything from direct loans to investments in joint ventures. The period between 2010 and 2013 was particularly significant, with Venezuela accounting for 64% of new Chinese credit lines in Latin America, aimed primarily at energy and infrastructure projects.
With Nicolás Maduro taking office in 2013, the dynamics continued, as China extended credit facilities totaling over $40 billion. However, the drop in oil prices starting in 2014 and the deep economic crisis in Venezuela marked a tipping point. New loans drastically decreased, and attention shifted to renegotiating an increasing debt, estimated at $19 billion in 2023. Aimless ambitious projects, like a $7.5 billion high-speed train and home appliance factories, remained unfinished or failed, highlighting the challenges of investing amid instability.
The Reasons Behind the Giant: Oil, Geopolitics, and Strategic Opportunities
The ongoing Chinese investment in Venezuela, despite evident risks, is based on a number of strategic reasons:
Access to Energy Resources: Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world. For a China with an insatiable energy demand, securing a supply source, even if currently diminished, remains a long-term strategic priority. The “loan-for-oil” model was initially designed to ensure a steady flow of crude to the Asian giant.
Geopolitical Influence in Latin America: Since the Chávez era, Venezuela has become a key ally in China’s vision of a multipolar world, openly challenging U.S. hegemony in its own backyard. Maintaining this alliance allows China to project its influence in the region, paving the way for connections with other countries and bolstering its position as a relevant global player.
Economic Opportunities (Past and Potential): During the oil boom, Venezuela presented an attractive market for investment in infrastructure and diverse sectors. Although the crisis has clouded these opportunities, China still hopes to participate in the eventual economic recovery of the country, securing contracts and access to natural resources.
Limited Political Affinity: While Chávez promoted a “21st-century socialism” that resonated with aspects of the Chinese development model, the relationship has primarily been pragmatic, driven by economic and geopolitical interests rather than a deep ideological affinity with Maduro’s current regime.
Venezuela: A Strategic Pawn on the Global Chessboard
The geopolitical importance of Venezuela for China goes beyond its vast hydrocarbon reserves. The Caribbean nation has become a strategic asset on multiple fronts:
Counterbalance to the United States: In a context of growing strategic competition between Beijing and Washington, maintaining an ally in Latin America that openly challenges U.S. influence is invaluable for China. Venezuela stands as a friction point that limits the capability of the U.S. to focus solely on containing China’s rise in other regions.
Gateway to the Region: The relationship with Venezuela has facilitated the expansion of Chinese influence into other Latin American countries through trade agreements, loans, and investments. Preserving this link ensures the continuity of this regional strategy.
Long-term Energy Security: Despite the current decline in oil shipments, Venezuela remains a crucial energy reserve potential for China in a global context of increasing demand and possible supply disruptions.
Support in Multilateral Forums: Venezuela has been a consistent ally of China in international organizations like the UN, supporting its positions on sensitive issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. This diplomatic backing is fundamental to Beijing’s global strategy.
Current Chinese Interests in the Situation
In the current context of 2025, China’s interests in Venezuela are focused on:
Debt Recovery: The immediate priority is to secure repayment of the approximately $19 billion owed, primarily through continued oil shipments and potential restructuring agreements.
Protection of Existing Investments: China seeks to safeguard its investments in the energy, mining, and other sectors, avoiding expropriation or loss of control in the event of a regime change.
Maintaining Geopolitical Influence: Keeping Venezuela as an anti-U.S. ally remains a key goal to counteract Washington’s influence in the region and project China’s soft power.
International Credibility: Abruptly abandoning an ally in distress could tarnish China’s reputation as a reliable partner for other countries in the Global South, raising doubts about its long-term commitment.
An Improbable Defection? Why Xi Jinping Will Not Yield to Washington
Considering the current context of intense strategic relations between China and the United States under the Trump administration in 2025, the possibility of Xi Jinping abandoning Nicolás Maduro to please Washington seems remote.
One of the reasons weighing heavily is the strategic and economic value that Venezuela holds for China; in other words, China’s economic and geopolitical interests in Venezuela are too significant to be sacrificed for an uncertain improvement in relations with the U.S. The potential loss of investment, uncollectible debts, and diminished regional influence would be too great a cost.
Another aspect to consider is strategic competition. In a landscape of increasing rivalry, conceding in Venezuela would be seen by Beijing as a unilateral concession to Washington, thus bolstering the position of its main competitor in a region deemed by the U.S. as its sphere of influence.
Moreover, the coherence of China’s foreign policy must be understood. Abandoning Maduro would contradict the fundamental principles of China’s foreign policy of non-interference in internal affairs and respect for national sovereignty. This could set a negative precedent and breed distrust among other allies and partners.
The Chinese regime also benefits from uncertainty, as there are no guarantees that abandoning Maduro would result in a substantial and lasting improvement in relations with the United States, especially in a context of ongoing trade and technological tensions.
Future Scenarios: Continued Pragmatism
Although a total abandonment of the Maduro regime by China seems unlikely, Beijing may opt for a more pragmatic approach, reducing its financial exposure, and conditioning its support on certain economic or political reforms. The possibility of adjustments in the relationship could arise if the United States offered significant concessions in exchange for a shift in China’s stance toward Venezuela. However, any movements in this direction would primarily be guided by China’s own strategic and economic interests, rather than a desire to please Washington.
In conclusion, the relationship between China and Venezuela, forged in oil and geopolitics, persists despite challenges. For Xi Jinping, keeping Maduro in power, although costly and complex, remains a strategy that serves China’s long-term interests in Latin America and its global competition with the United States. The Asian giant appears willing to weather the Venezuelan storm, betting on a future where its investment and influence will pay off, without conceding to external pressure.