The current state of affairs is as follows: Juan Guaidó, the head of the Venezuelan Congress, proclaimed himself the interim president of the country. Guaidó based his actions on an interpretation of Article 233 of the Venezuelan constitution, which states that when an absolute absence occurs on the day of the inauguration (January 10), the head of Congress must assume power and call for new elections within 30 days. Since Nicolás Maduro’s last electoral victory was not regarded as legitimate, many countries pledged to officially recognize Guaidó. Other nations have promised support, while a third group—holding billions in outstanding debts or depending on Venezuela’s patronage—has allied with Nicolás Maduro.
As usual, Russia has made absurd claims about non-intervention, respect for international law, and sovereignty. Vlad is the second largest individual creditor of the chavista regime. China, the largest individual creditor, brought its usual nonsense about opposition to foreign intervention. There could be over $80 billion at stake between the two. Then there’s Turkey, which has been busy positioning itself as a reliable partner for Maduro lately.
The true Donald Trump made a characteristic statement, declaring that his administration no longer recognizes Maduro. Guaidó is now seen as the new president of Venezuela by the Trump administration, which has already begun talking about “all options are on the table.” Dialogue with Maduro is deemed a failure. U.S.-based bondholders are sure to be pleased with this.
Brazil and Colombia have recognized Guaidó, along with the Lima Group. Maduro’s allies on the continent are limited to the usual outcasts (Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba).
This site has previously discussed negotiated solutions. In some circles, this is viewed as a form of liquidation. However, all conflicts with similar characteristics have been resolved in one of two ways: either through regulated negotiations or by force. Negotiations, under certain agreed preconditions, remain, in our opinion, a better option than the alternative. What exactly will not talking to Maduro achieve? The Lima Group issued a statement a few days ago, essentially asking Maduro to step down. That’s actually more than foolish.
Still on the negotiation side of the argument, there are many things that the coalition behind Guaidó could do to force Maduro to accept preconditions and engage in meaningful discussions with parties that are not all under his control (the puppet José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero doesn’t count). So Russia has offered to mediate. The U.S. government could sit at the table alongside Guaidó with the following:
– CFIUS will reject Rosneft’s acquisition of nearly half of CITGO as collateral;
– Sanctions related to Ukraine against Putin and his buddies/companies might be reviewed;
– Venezuela’s oil exports to the U.S. will be banned within 30 days;
– PDVSA and CITGO, along with their current boards, will be sanctioned within 30 days;
– Financial networks and operators who have facilitated Maduro’s regime corruption in the past will be sanctioned within 30 days;
– Venezuelan fugitives (Raúl Gorrín, Francisco Convit, and unidentified co-conspirators) will be delivered to face charges from the Department of Justice within 30 days;
– More accusations against the most corrupt chavistas will be revealed in 30 days;
– All official bank accounts held in U.S. banks will be frozen immediately;
– Swiss banks that have participated in schemes involving Venezuela and PDVSA must be declared money laundering concerns before sitting down, so that detailed information about Venezuela-related corruption can be turned over to U.S. law enforcement for use as leverage in negotiations;
– Before sitting down, the Department of Justice should require all trading houses, controlled by Switzerland and Russia, to provide evidence of every agreement made with PDVSA;
– The gold/equivalent held by the Bank of England will be seized before sitting down to use as leverage in the negotiation;
– U.S. federal agencies could form a task force with their counterparts in Spain, Andorra, Portugal, Canada, France, Switzerland, and the Lima Group member countries to strip Maduro and his network of all cash and assets before sitting down, to use them as leverage;
– Any violence in the name of the Venezuelan military and Maduro’s other partners (Colombian paramilitaries/drug cartels, Cuban intelligence, Russian mercenaries) must be met with special forces aligned with countries supporting Guaidó.
With that in hand, Guaidó’s side can begin to negotiate and detail the preconditions. Amnesty could be offered. Elections could be called, organized by an impartial arbiter within a strictly defined timeframe and under full observation from international parties. All parties must agree on any outcome.
These are just a few measures, but Venezuelans must understand that unless a U.S.-led military invasion is in preparation, Maduro must be forced out through negotiations. They won’t be overthrown by rallies or town halls, nor by Twitter. Without the support of the Venezuelan military, Guaidó is as dangerous to chavismo as Leopoldo López was under house arrest. He can make all the statements he wants, but without real power behind him, it’s just noise.
It’s foolish and ignorant to think that criminals in total control will simply relinquish power. Likewise, it’s childish to ignore the fact that in most cases, many abhorrent people get away with it: just look at what the architect of this disaster, Rafael Ramírez, is doing today with Bachelet. Beyond disgusting, it’s very hard to swallow, but the question remains: what are the alternatives? How else can this situation come to an end?
Venezuelans who howl about chavista blood should be ready to back it up with actions, and we have seen in the recent past how long such positions hold once the National Guard and collectives start firing.
Maduro’s hand must be forced. The same goes for the military supporting his regime. There must be real prospects of complete and absolute financial strangulation, followed by negotiation, and for that to happen, the silly playground postures that make Putin look good are simply not useful. The vast majority of the Western Hemisphere supports Guaidó, but there’s another player there with formidable strength and allies that must be considered. If the opposition could unilaterally resolve Venezuela’s problems via public proclamations, they would have done so many years ago. And, tragically, chavismo invited some of the worst elements of the world, who have become stakeholders. Not recognizing that is nothing more than the flat earth syndrome.