Scholars in the social sciences will likely view Venezuela in the future as a unique case. A self-proclaimed socialist revolution, led by an idealistic military coup leader, succeeded in obliterating one of the best-managed state energy conglomerates the world has seen, leading to the greatest humanitarian crisis to affect the Western Hemisphere. Out of nowhere, a new face emerged (the President of the Congress, Juan Guaidó), who garnered wide international support, transitioning from symbolic implications to real consequences for the existing regime within hours. All imaginable superlatives apply. A transition is sought, yet unfortunately, there is no roadmap; so how will it be executed?
Convincing a constellation of criminal organizations, akin to cartels (the kleptocratic regime of Nicolás Maduro), to peacefully relinquish power is not a feasible feat. Offers must exceed what is already available. Take gasoline smuggling, for instance, one of the mafias controlled by factions of the Venezuelan army: it’s said to generate profits of more than $4 billion per year for those involved. What offer could Guaidó make to these people? Consider the multibillion-dollar drug trafficking: what incentive could be offered to the cartels in the Andean region, who operate with absolute impunity and state protection, to vacate the only space from which shipments can leave uninterrupted?
There is nothing realistically that Guaidó can offer these elements. No sanction regime aimed at a depleted, debt-ridden oil-exporting company could impact these criminals. Moreover, two of the world’s three superpowers are heavily invested in Maduro for financial reasons: approximately $80 billion is at stake. The other superpower has primary and secondary bondholders who could have a similar amount in circulation. They also have a legitimate claim for both principal and interest. Guaidó’s Congress never approved any of that, yet must deal with these stakeholders nonetheless.
Carlos Vecchio, Guaidó’s Chargé d’Affaires in the U.S., stated that any agreements not approved by Congress—assuming Congress means from 2015 onwards—will not be recognized. Thus, even before taking control, he would alienate formidable enemies. When asked how to regain control of CITGO and its revenues, Vecchio candidly admitted he had only been in office for two days and did not have a clear answer.
Julio Borges, another representative of Guaidó’s interim administration, insists that Cuba maintains chavismo in power. While Cuba was once a key ally of chavismo, that is no longer the case. The Colombian terrorist group ELN represents a much greater problem today, exerting control over vast gold-producing regions in Venezuela. What negotiation, aside from war, could compel those individuals to leave? This site asked Borges about Guaidó’s amnesty offer. While drug trafficking and human rights violations won’t be forgiven, corruption does not seem to have been considered. It’s no surprise that Luisa Ortega and Rafael Ramírez are competing to become presidential candidates in the upcoming elections.
The greatest danger, however, might be Guaidó’s own source of legitimacy (the Congress of Venezuela), where chavismo has 55 representatives and is the largest block. Should thoroughly corrupt leaders aligned with the opposition, such as Henry Ramos Allup, Manuel Rosales, Omar Barboza, Henrique Capriles, and Timoteo Zambrano, accept a cohabitation/co-government compromise with Maduro, who can then say that they lack prestige?
Election are seen as the solution; however, the electoral arbiter is nothing more than an appendage of the regime. The current electoral authorities are fully supportive of Maduro, just like the judiciary. How can Guaidó call for new elections? Who will lead the process when the appointment of new electoral authorities is almost certainly blocked by a Supreme Court controlled by individuals like Raúl Gorrín and Cilia Flores? If manual voting is implemented, as is the case in Venezuelan universities, chavismo will suffer such a blow that it will take at least a generation to recover. Is this even on the table?
The legal actions of ConocoPhillips against PDVSA provide perhaps the best set of guidelines on how to push Venezuela into a negotiating position. The Trump administration should take cues and replicate/expand actions to make Maduro’s position untenable, forcing him to accept the conditions for transition. However, this will not eliminate the ELN, drug cartels, military mafias, China, and Russia, etc.
Everyone seems to agree that Maduro’s time is up; regrettably, nobody knows how or when that will happen. Since the recent bombing in Bogotá, Iván Duque has the legitimate right to pursue the perpetrators, wherever they may be. Will he take action, as Uribe/Santos did in Ecuador with Raúl Reyes? Will the current level of international support for Guaidó survive such an event? Is there any situation room somewhere analyzing scenarios like these? In typical Venezuelan fashion, this transition appears to be a “let’s see how it goes” process that lacks any semblance of clarity.