You don’t need to be an expert to see an alarming pattern in Venezuela: money laundering has thrived during the years of the “revolution,” becoming a tool that benefits global mafias and directly attacks the economies of the United States and Europe.
The Venezuelan regime’s currency policy is not just restrictive; it appears intentionally designed to obstruct legal access to foreign currency, despite high societal demand. Although the country continues to sell oil, gold, and other minerals, the trace of that income in foreign currency disappears in the formal economy. This manufactured scarcity drives honest citizens and merchants toward parallel markets or “black markets,” which conveniently serve as the main channels for laundering operations of criminal organizations.
Diosdado Cabello and the laundering machinery
It’s a revealing “coincidence” that Diosdado Cabello Rondón, a powerful figure and former interior minister, apparently “knows nothing” about the rampant capital legitimization in Venezuela. His appointment of Freddy Bernal as governor of Táchira state has coincided with an outright opening to currency exchanges and negotiations in that border zone, a traditional epicenter of illicit activities.
Meanwhile, in the National Assembly, Pedro Carreño, identified as an active member of this network, stands as the regime’s defender, denouncing the European Union. Complicity seems to extend to the legislative upper echelons, with Jorge Jesús Rodríguez Gómez, the Assembly president, co-responsible for a currency policy that clearly favors money laundering. His legislative functions, including law approval, oversight, and control of currency policy, make him an active participant in this scheme. If the European Union were consistent, one might ask why it does not sanction all the deputies who, without any investigation, support Rodríguez and Carreño’s actions.
The vicious circle of illicit currencies
Terrorist groups such as the Tren de Aragua, drug traffickers, and human trafficking mafias operating in the United States and Europe generate millions in cash. Illegal activities such as drug purchases or extortion payments aren’t settled with checks or bank transfers. This accumulated cash needs to return to its owners, mainly in Colombia or Venezuela, to cover operational expenses, raw material acquisition, logistics, and of course, commissions for the corrupt officials appointed by the regime to “allow” this activity. In Venezuela, meritocracy in public positions is a mirage; key roles in the fight against crime are filled by trusted personnel, not by those with the interest or skill to combat it.
The most well-known money laundering method is the currency exchange. A Venezuelan citizen hands over honest bolívares, the fruit of their labor, and in exchange, the mafias deposit illicit cash into foreign accounts or give foreign currency to a trustworthy third party in Europe or the United States. To facilitate this, these mafias use national bank accounts (personal or corporate, either their own or borrowed for a fee) and move money at their convenience, prioritizing border areas where the regime deliberately promotes the use and exchange of currencies. This way, the laundered money returns to the true bosses.
Previously, bolívares were withdrawn in cash and transported to Cúcuta, Colombia. However, since Freddy Bernal’s appointment in Táchira by Diosdado Cabello, exchanges are conducted openly within Venezuelan territory, evidencing a normalization and internal control of the laundering process. Another notorious method emerged with the “CADIVI quotas”: Venezuelans traveling abroad were approached by mafias offering to “scrape” their cards in exchange for cash. Thus, citizens would deliver legal money through their cards, and the mafias would give them illicit cash, then withdrawing the legal Venezuelan money from CADIVI accounts at ATMs in Colombia.
Transnational damage: beyond borders
Venezuelan authorities have focused their efforts on policies that, paradoxically, harm the United States and Europe, whom they label as “imperialism.” The regime is aware that allowing money laundering from illicit activities abroad causes multifaceted harm to those societies:
Strengthening organized crime: It allows criminal activities to operational and strengthen, creating a vicious cycle of illegality.
Institutional corruption: Mafias use illicit money to corrupt institutions and officials in the affected countries, undermining the rule of law.
Public insecurity: The illicit activities generating this money directly translate into increased insecurity and violence in populations.
Financial market distortion: The uncontrolled influx of illicit money distorts prices and creates unfair competition, affecting legitimate businesses.
Inflation in real estate: The injection of illicit capital into the real estate sector inflates housing and commercial prices, making them unaffordable for honest citizens.
For a citizen in the United States or Europe witnessing unjustified spikes in housing, commercial spaces, goods, and services, it is highly likely that this is a direct effect of the money laundering promoted and permitted by the Maduro regime, fueling the staggering figures that criminal organizations operate globally.
A failed state at the service of crime
The illegitimacy of Maduro’s government has isolated Venezuela from the international police and intelligence community. This isolation is not an error; it directly favors the mafias, as the distrust in information sharing and lack of cooperation in this battle are total. The presence of Diosdado Cabello in power, with his record, undermines any police coordination. The “inventions” of judicial cases to detain opponents and the use of INTERPOL for political persecutions are evidence of an institutionality serving criminal interests.
It is undeniable that the regime’s upper echelons, along with military and police high command, are complicit in crime, whether for political ends (like electoral theft) or economic (evidenced by the corruption cases uncovered abroad and the multiple accusations of drug trafficking, none of whom have voluntarily appeared in the United States to defend themselves). The same figures always rotate positions, ensuring the continuity of illicit operations.
The deliberate weakening and politicization of institutions and the judicial system in Venezuela form the basis that enables the proliferation of these crimes. When a country is used as a safe haven to evade international justice, we are confronted with a true Failed State.
How can one, then, justify the proliferation of so many casinos in Venezuela, when cruise ship arrivals are nonexistent, flights are limited, and several countries have alerted about the risk of kidnapping their citizens to use them as “bargaining chips”? Casinos and musical concerts are well-known and long-standing methods for large-scale money laundering. The sale of vehicles at exorbitant prices, finding buyers willing to justify them, is another sign of this illegal economy.
The Maduro regime’s currency policy is not an economic failure; it’s a deliberate strategy that turns Venezuela into a money laundering hub, negatively impacting security and economic stability in the United States and Europe. The complicity of high-ranking government figures in this criminal operation raises serious questions about Venezuela’s real willingness to combat transnational organized crime.