Diosdado Cabello holds the keys to Venezuela’s future. Not Nicolás Maduro, nor his Cuban handlers. Not Henrique Capriles or Rafael Ramírez. Not the criminal enterprises that support chavismo. Definitely not the electoral authorities (CNE), who will not permit a recount or a meaningful audit, as Capriles requests. Not Congress. Not the media. Not the “international community.” Not the United States. And certainly not Colombia (Santos has hit an all-time low, if that was ever possible). Everything hinges, in my view, on how Diosdado Cabello plays his cards.
Cabello graduated from the Military Academy of the Venezuelan Armed Forces in 1987, ranking second among 216 officers (Tomás Montilla Padrón, 87th class). Many of Cabello’s colleagues participated in the coup led by Hugo Chávez in 1992 and were rewarded by Chávez once he attained power. Cabello has been a constant figure in chavismo, along with Jesse Chacón, Alejandro Andrade, and José Vielma Mora, to name just a few. Cabello and his peers have secured key positions within chavismo: tax collection, military, telecommunications, finance, and governance. His colleagues control many of the most significant military commands in Venezuela. On July 5, 2012, Chávez announced a new wave of promotions within the military: 42 officers were elevated to Brigadier General, with direct command over the troops. Of those 42, 36 belonged to Cabello’s 87th class. However, and here lies a crucial point, 97 members of that class are still active in the army, but only 36 were promoted. This indicates that 61 colonels, Cabello’s peers, deserve a promotion. It didn’t happen last year, which sources have told me caused significant discontent that Cabello is skillfully leveraging.
The power to promote individuals within the military was solely in Hugo Chávez’s hands. In what can only be seen as a political decision, Chávez chose to promote some, but not all, of Cabello’s companions. Meanwhile, there’s never been any love lost between Cabello and the Castro dictators. In fact, Cabello never shared Hugo Chávez’s servile attitude and infatuation with Fidel Castro: he rarely, if ever, visited Cuba and is said to despise what he perceives as an affront in taking orders from Cuba.
The Castro dictators chose Maduro for obvious reasons. A semi-literate yes-man, intellectually limited, through whom the gradual transfer of sovereignty from Chávez to Cuba could continue indefinitely. However, the Castro brothers miscalculated immensely. They put all their eggs in the Maduro basket, which could prove fatal to their plan. Because Maduro, a civilian, has zero influence over the Venezuelan military, a power that Cabello clearly has.
When the time comes, the Venezuelan military will intervene and decide who runs the show, as has always been the case. At that time, neither Maduro nor his Cuban handlers will stand a chance. Cabello has already expressed, on Twitter, what could be interpreted as an open threat to Maduro, whose slim margin of victory over Capriles is viewed as a monumental failure that could have ended the “revolution.” Cabello could easily capitalize on new demands concerning the very real firepower of his classmates. With Chávez out of the picture, there is absolutely no one to hold Cabello back, should he choose to act against Maduro.
Throughout all this, Capriles is merely a bystander, background noise. He lacks the power to dictate the game and will likely end up in prison (though that could change the game, but it remains to be seen if Cabello and the Castros are foolish enough).