Every
historical event has a defining moment. I propose that Hugo Chavez’s
political career didn’t start with the coup d’état,
but rather with that interview in which he addressed the nation
and uttered the famous “for now.” That brief speech captured
the imagination of society and propelled the coup leader to
stardom. More than two decades later, Venezuela finds itself
in a dire situation. It’s not the same, or better, than
in 1992 or 1999; it’s worse—much worse, in every measurable
aspect. In 2015, an event occurred that could mark
the beginning of the end for chavismo.
The
Executive Order from President Barack Obama,
freezing accounts and assets, and suspending visas for seven henchmen
of the Nicolas Maduro regime due to serious human rights
violations and corruption among other reasons, has been, in my opinion, a
defining moment in Venezuela’s political history. This is not about
the language declaring Venezuela a threat to the U.S. which is merely a legal requirement
for such executive decisions, but rather the repercussions that said order
has had. Just days after President Obama’s order,
the U.S. Treasury Department, through its Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), made another
announcement, this time targeting Banca Privada de Andorra (BPA).
The FINCEN order identifies a Russian, a Chinese individual, and mentions, without
providing names, financial operators allegedly involved in the appropriation and laundering of 4.2 billion dollars from
PDVSA.
The
FINCEN announcement has sparked a seismic shift in the Andorran and Spanish financial sectors, as BPA owns the Banco de
Madrid, another bank operating in Spain. Investigations by the Spanish Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary
Infractions (SEPBLAC), reported by El Mundo, identify
six Venezuelan operatives named by FINCEN. The individuals mentioned by El Mundo are:
Alcides Rondón, Javier Alvarado,
Nervis Villalobos, Carlos Aguilera, Omar Farías, and Rafael Jiménez.
Subsequent reports claim that these individuals collectively received
bribes amounting to approximately 140 million dollars for securing
contracts with Venezuelan state institutions.
While
this scandal unfolds in the Spanish press, the Venezuelan media remains silent.
This is due to the fact that chavismo controls,
either directly or indirectly, almost all major media outlets in Venezuela. What could emerge about the acquisitions of
these media is particularly grave. Whether that happens or not,
some of the operators involved in these acquisitions,
along with the chavista regime, are also under investigation and scrutiny from U.S. federal authorities. The Executive Order identifies seven chavista officials,
but they are not the only ones. Behind the scenes, federal agents have been updating databases with information on the activities of Victor Vargas, Victor Gill, David Osío, Wilmer Ruperti, Luis Oberto, Roberto Rincón, among
other so-called businessmen, bankers, and Venezuelan financial operators.
Some, like Vargas and Gill, are already
cooperating with authorities after losing their visas to
travel to the U.S. Others, like Alejandro Betancourt, Pedro Trebbau,
Francisco Convit, and Edgar Romero Lazo (Derwick
Associates), are being investigated by the Manhattan District Attorney’s office and other federal agencies.
One
of the most emblematic cases of the policy to suspend visas and
seize assets arising from corruption is that of Alejandro
Andrade. Involved in the secret accounts scandal in Switzerland,
at HSBC, where
he managed around 698 million dollars between 2006 and 2007,
Andrade had his visa revoked on one hand, and was invited to cooperate
on the other. His presence in the U.S., where he lives lavishly, leaves no
doubt about his cooperation. Another individual in the U.S., wanted by the “justice”
system in Venezuela, is Rafael Isea.
It’s
clear that the Obama administration has either lost patience
with chavismo or opted to use chavismo as a pawn in its chess game with Cuba. While the U.S. and Cuba seek to reestablish relations,
Venezuela has become a sort of alternate theater of operations where both Obama
and the Cuban dictators negotiate their positions. Maduro obediently follows
whatever orders come from Havana, while Washington strikes,
where it hurts most, at chavismo and, consequently, at
castroism. Any blockade or hindrance to the fraudulent management
of Venezuelan public funds internationally is, in fact, another twist of the screw on
the finances sustaining both kleptocracies.
Meanwhile,
the official Venezuelan opposition continues to adhere strictly to the chavista script. No one should be surprised by the communiqué from
the MUD, essentially rejecting Obama’s measure, as its highest leaders,
Ramón Guillermo Aveledo and Ramón José
Medina, advocated against sanctions on chavista regime officials and their financial operatives in meetings with the
State Department. The boliburguesía that keeps opposition leadership on its payroll does not want sanctions. They and their employees are not keen on disrupting the chavista status quo. A
Leopoldo Martínez, David Osío’s man in Washington, is not interested in losing his visa and his boss’s ill-gotten assets. The same applies to Ramón José Medina and Victor Vargas, or Henry Ramos
Allup and his brother-in-law and partners at Derwick. Ramón Guillermo Aveledo has no interest in chavista justice digging into his past and connections to professional baseball in Venezuela. Clearly, some segments of the Venezuelan opposition will be remembered as the most abject group of traitors in history.
President Obama aims to establish his legacy, and Cuba holds a special place within it. Sixteen years of chavismo have turned Venezuela into little more than a Cuban colony. Perhaps the submission and surrender of our sovereignty, amid U.S.-Cuban relations, will bring unexpected consequences for chavismo.
What’s certain is that even the Cuban dictators are not willing to sacrifice their future for chavismo. Secret negotiations with the U.S. began in 2009, when Hugo Chavez was in his prime. All done behind the back of the biggest benefactor of
castroism since the Soviet era. Individuals in Chavez’s inner circle, when faced with choosing between holding onto stolen fortunes or providing information against the chavista regime,
like Andrade, do not hesitate to betray those who enabled their wealth. The same will happen with bankers, contracted businessmen, and financial operators.
The
information that Andrade, Vargas, Gill, Isea, and others provide to the U.S.
will only increase the Maduro regime’s international problems. The spectrum of actions and sanctions, both direct and indirect, available to the Obama administration will shake the foundations of the revolutionary hierarchy, no matter how much UNASUR, CELAC, or the MUD protests. Uncle Sam is not after middle managers or intermediaries. Cabello, Ramirez, el Aissami, Jaua, Flores, Maduro… should be on high alert.