Alongside the agreement with Iran, the Bolivia-Russia alliance poses a challenge to U.S. influence in Latin America, while also reconfiguring the geopolitical dynamics of South America, generating tensions with Argentina and other neighboring countries.
A report highlights that although this alliance presents development opportunities for Bolivia, it also raises concerns due to the opacity of the signed agreements. Warnings about potential intersections with criminal networks are not overlooked.
This strategic alliance between Bolivia and Russia includes agreements in energy, nuclear technology, and lithium mining, as well as rare earth elements such as lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, and terbium, among others.
This relationship has strengthened since 2023, bolstering political, educational, and military cooperation between the two nations. Undoubtedly, it constitutes a geopolitical reshaping in Latin America.
This relationship raises a series of questions, especially when analyzed against the backdrop of Bolivia’s internal crisis and the upcoming 2025 elections. Concerns also emerge regarding interactions with Argentina’s Operativo Roca.
Connection and Areas of Cooperation
The report establishes that the Bolivia-Russia alliance, coupled with the South American country’s connection to Iran—especially regarding military and technological cooperation—generates regional security concerns.
This rapprochement between Bolivia and the Russian Federation includes key areas of cooperation such as energy and fuels, natural gas, nuclear research, training, and technological transfer, and military cooperation, among others.
Let’s examine the details:
Energy and Fuels
Since Bolivia relies heavily on fuel imports, the importation of Russian diesel increased significantly from December 2024. This decision marks a structural shift in Bolivia’s energy policy. In this context, concerns arise that this growing dependency could undermine Bolivia’s energy autonomy and be exploited by Russia as a “geopolitical lever.”
Natural Gas Projects
Currently, negotiations are underway between Gazprom and YPFB regarding the exploration and exploitation of new natural gas fields. Some reports indicate that Russia may finance the modernization of Bolivian infrastructure in exchange for preferential access. The lack of information and transparency surrounding these negotiations raises doubts about the terms involved.
Center for Nuclear Research (CIDTN)
Center for Nuclear Research (CIDTN)
Leading the Center for Nuclear Research (CIDTN), which is being developed in El Alto, is the group of Russian state-owned companies Rosatom, which represents the “largest nuclear project in Latin America.” Its completion is expected by the end of 2025. It includes a research reactor, facilities for nuclear medicine, and agricultural applications.
The defense and aerospace publication “Jane’s Defence Weekly” warned about its “potential dual use,” which could involve electronic surveillance or the development of technical capabilities for military applications. The report notes that cooperation in nuclear fuel management strengthens this collaboration. It also points out that Rosatom won a bid in Brazil for uranium processing and enrichment, with broader nuclear cooperation plans with Brazil by late 2025.
Training and Technological Transfer
According to Rosatom, over 200 Bolivian technicians have been trained in Russia. Intelligence forums suggest that this training may encompass “sensitive knowledge, such as the handling of radioactive materials,” raising concerns among Western intelligence agencies.
Lithium Mining and Strategic Projects
In the Uyuni salt flat, Uranium One Group (Rosatom) and YLB are developing a pilot plant for direct lithium extraction. The project represents an investment of USD 970 million, establishing Russia as a key player in the “lithium triangle” (Bolivia, Argentina, Chile).
Alerts
The report issues some alerts, primarily warning about the opacity of the agreements made between Russia and Bolivia and the regional perception of these agreements. It underscores the lack of public details about the CIDTN, which fuels suspicions in Chile and Peru, where there are fears that Bolivia could become a “center of Russian influence in the region.”
In the context of global competition, the report notes that Rosatom is competing with Chinese and Western companies for Bolivian lithium. It emphasizes that Bolivia prefers non-Western partners to avoid political conditions. However, this raises the question of whether Russian technology is as advanced as Chinese technology.
It also references that lithium is critical for the global energy transition, and Russia may seek to secure access to negotiate with China and Europe while Bolivia uses the project to assert its sovereignty as the Bolivian opposition criticizes the “lack of transparency in contracts.”
It indicates that Russia has sold military equipment to Bolivia, including anti-aircraft and armored systems, while also providing training. Although to a lesser extent than with Venezuela, it strengthens Bolivian capabilities.
With Russian support Bolivia became a partner state of BRICS in January 2025. This has enhanced its “international projection and alignment with an anti-Western bloc.” Speculations about lithium transactions in alternative currencies to the dollar have emerged. Educational agreements that include the teaching of Russian and scholarships aim to “consolidate an anti-imperialist narrative.”
Some reports suggest that this cooperation could involve “cyber defense systems,” which raises concerns for the U.S. and Argentina due to Bolivia’s potential as a Russian “proxy.”
Additionally, the Bolivia-Iran agreement from 2023 includes Shahed-136 drones. Deep web discussions suggest that Russia might “facilitate this cooperation, creating a technological military transfer axis between Moscow, Tehran, and La Paz.”
Geopolitical and Security Implications
The report states that the Bolivia-Russia alliance and the agreement with Iran correspond to an “emerging axis that includes China and North Korea,” described as a “quartet of chaos” by American analysts. This axis aims to “counter U.S. influence,” but lacks ideological cohesion beyond anti-imperialism.
Meanwhile, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil observe these alliances with caution. For instance, the timing of the Bolivia-Iran agreement coinciding with the anniversary of the AMIA bombing sparked protests in Argentina. The perception of Bolivia as a “base for Iranian activities, possibly with Russian support, intensifies tensions.”
Moreover, alignment with sanctioned powers could limit Bolivia’s access to Western markets, complicating its integration into Mercosur or its relationship with the European Union. A possible “debt trap” similar to that of Sri Lanka with China is warned against.
Regional Security and Perception of Threat
The potential dual use of nuclear energy, the CIDTN, and Iranian drones create concerns. There is speculation that the nuclear center could annex sectors for electronic surveillance or even be used as a base for Russian cyber operations.
The proximity to the Triple Frontier, a hotspot for drug trafficking and Hezbollah activities, amplifies the risks. There are reports suggesting that Iran could be using criminal networks in Bolivia to finance operations, “possibly with Russian logistical support.”
The Trump administration maintains a tough stance toward leftist governments. Some analysts believe that the U.S. could impose “sanctions on Bolivia if it perceives a direct threat”, especially due to the Iranian drones or the CIDTN.
Similarly, it is noted that Elon Musk’s interest in Bolivian lithium could translate into “pressures to displace Russia and China from the sector.” The freezing of anti-drug funds by the Trump administration in March 2025 could signal a “replacement pivot, where security operations would rely on the Armed Forces,” leading to a more internal focus. The designation of Mexican cartels and other organizations as terrorists by Trump reinforces this approach.
It is reported that both the Bolivia-Iran memorandum and the Russian alliance are opaque, generating regional distrust. Both agreements seek to diversify partners and challenge the U.S. The agreement with Iran may be more symbolic, but its combination with Russian cooperation “creates a perception of threat.”
It is believed that the Shahed-136 drones and Russian nuclear cooperation could be interconnected, suggesting that Russia “facilitates the transfer of Iranian technology to Bolivia, creating a military cooperation axis” targeting Washington and experts in Argentina and Chile.
Argentina also views the agreement with Iran as a “veiled threat to regional security.” The temporal coincidence of this agreement with Iran and the strengthening of ties with Russia is seen as a “coordinated Bolivian strategy, possibly mediated by China.”
While political polarization and the economic crisis are not addressed in the agreements, this could limit their implementation and affect the 2025 elections, posing a risk of “large-scale social and political crisis.” Bolivia’s critical economic situation makes it “an easy target for these anti-Western countries.”
Moreover, reports indicate that Bolivia could become a “node for illegal mining, drug trafficking, exotic wood sales, and strategic minerals,” possibly involving actors linked to criminal organizations.
Strategic Recommendations
The report offers several recommendations:
- Create a dialogue and cooperation team with neighboring intelligence services and international agencies (EUROPOL, U.S. agencies, Southern Command) to share information and conduct joint operations. Focus on CIDTN, Iranian drones, and criminal networks.
- Promote a dialogue in the OAS to address regional concerns, inviting Bolivia to clarify its agreements. Avoid confrontational stances.
- Seek satellite intelligence support and surveillance technology from the U.S.
- Combat drug trafficking and possible Iranian activities in the Triple Frontier, closely collaborating with the Paraguayan intelligence system.
- Enhance direct intelligence collaboration with Chile and Peru.
- Utilize international forums (UN, IAEA, OAS) to pressure Bolivia to disclose details of its agreements with Russia and Iran, especially in sensitive areas.
- Deepen South American alliances and partnerships with U.S. agencies to monitor possible attempts by Russia and Iran to influence the 2025 Bolivian elections. Support organizations like the OAS to ensure electoral transparency.
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