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Home » Andrés René Guzmán: The Shadowy Businessman Behind Controversial Bilateral Deals in South America

Andrés René Guzmán: The Shadowy Businessman Behind Controversial Bilateral Deals in South America

LONDON, 01.17.2013 | The above is an email sent to Oscar Alfredo Thomas by Andrés René Guzmán “for the Minister’s attention.” Oscar Alfredo Thomas is the Executive Director of the Binational Yaciretá Entity, an Argentine-Paraguayan joint commission responsible for constructing and operating the Yaciretá Dam, and “the Minister” refers to Julio de Vido, Argentina’s Minister of Planning and Public Investment.

Guzmán asks Thomas to forward a message to De Vido, who then sends it to José María Olazagasti (De Vido’s right-hand man, overseeing unofficial dealings related to Venezuela), who ultimately passes it to the Argentine ambassador Cristina Kirchner in Caracas, Alicia Castro. Guzmán’s message further explains his background, the capabilities of Fluviomar, and intentions for a comprehensive agreement with PDVSA. This is fully readable here. Just 10 days later, on May 15, 2009, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the parties. In July, Guzmán contacted De Vido again through Thomas with an update on the deal. Then, in August, the cousin of President Hugo Chávez, Asdrúbal Chávez, officially announced the merger of PDVSA and Fluviomar, leading to the formation of Fluvialba.

In another revealing email, Andrés Guzmán is referred to as an “advisor” to former Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo, although Guzmán is from Argentina…

So, who is this Andrés René Guzmán, who enjoys such good relationships and access to top officials in Argentina, Paraguay, and Venezuela?

Guzmán is mentioned as the Manager of Fluviomar in a commercial cable titled “Argentina’s Fluviomar, Samuel Gutnisky integrate the fleets of the Paraná River,” dated March 2001: “FM Navegación (FMN) announced it is integrating the Paraná-Paraguay fleets of Fluviomar SA and Samuel Gutnisky SA… A joint service between FMN and Cia Naviera Horamar SA and Cinco-Bacia from Brazil brings the total to over 250 barges, 28 tugs.” He is also referred to as General Manager of Fluviomar at the IV Andean Ports Colloquium held in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, in October 2001.

ABC Color, the largest newspaper in Paraguay, tracked Guzmán’s background in the region, publishing an article on his connections to President Fernando Lugo in July 2009. It depicts him as a former taxi driver, an evangelical preacher, and even a pesticide controller (sprayer), who eventually got into the river cargo business. According to this source, Guzmán started with Vilas, a cargo company that went bankrupt under his leadership. From there, he built a fortune overnight by acquiring barges (as mentioned earlier), establishing himself as a powerful entrepreneur in that sector. Guzmán worked with the López brothers (owners of Horamar), who got rich providing cargo services to Petropar, Paraguay’s oil company. He also had dealings with American Commercial Barge Line (ACBL, now ACL).

ABC Color also lists him as one of the main financial backers of Fernando Lugo in 2008, prior to winning the presidency of Paraguay. What’s clear is that Guzmán secured some favorable deals from Lugo once he took office. His Argentine companies, Fluviomar / Conosur, displaced those of the López brothers (Horamar) and all other Paraguayan businesses, illegally acquiring rights to transport the majority of crude oil and derivatives from Petropar. So far, everything seems normal, but he soon faced issues: another article states that Provident Group, based in New York, tried to seize $30 million in payments from Petropar to Fluviomar due to non-payment of a loan (from previous acquisitions). ABC Color added that Fluviomar had outstanding debts with Cargill Finance, $80 million; Medley Found, $50 million; Merril Lynch, $20 million; and MMX, $10 million; and was sued by Ocean Bulker in the U.S. for another $25 million.

The deal with Petropar was believed to be worth $550 million per year; unfortunately, it wasn’t meant to last long: Paraguay’s Procurement Commissioner ruled against the agreement, leading to their dismissal from office. However, Guzmán managed to win over Argentina’s President, Cristina Kirchner, and her Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chávez, securing his company’s participation in other lucrative deals:

His company Fluviomar partnered with Argentine TANDANOR to build 50 barges and 15 river vessels for PDVSA;
Fluviomar became a partner of Fluvialba, a binational joint venture between Venezuela and Argentina, to grant Venezuela access to MERCOSUR;
Fluviomar was set to transport—through the mixed company Fluvialba—all iron, soy, beef, and other purchases related to PDVSA/Venezuela via the Parana-Plata waterway of the Southern Cone;
part of the PDVSA / Petropar agreement, where PDVSA delivered oil, gas oil, and other derivatives under Delivered Ex Ship (DES) conditions in Villa Elisa, naming Fluviomar as the partner of choice.

One of his companies (Fluviomar) is mentioned in three separate agreements between Venezuela and Argentina. Hugo Chávez invited him to consult on how Venezuela could further develop the Orinoco riverway. He traveled to Venezuela with Cristina Kirchner to sign some questionable agreements. Additionally, Guzmán appears to have been involved with Palmat, a middleman company suspected of charging a 15% commission to all Argentine companies selling products or services to Venezuela as part of another undefined binational agreement. Judge Julián Ercolini requested from the Argentine Chancellery a copy of the bilateral agreement (valued at $500 million) signed between PDVSA and Fluviomar and sent another request to the General Inspectorate of Justice for them to provide records related to Palmat SA, Palmat USA, ACBL Hidrovías SA, Fluviomar, and Fluvialba, after allegations that these companies shared directors (Paloma Lowenthal and Juan de Dios Santucchi).

ACBL Hidrovias S.A., Fluviomar, and Palmat share the same address, and as for the directors, the evidence is equally compelling: Paloma Lowenthal was the Manager of Institutional Relations of Fluviomar in 2007. ACBL and Fluviomar also share the same general director in Venezuela, Exeario Enrique Gil Rivas [see here and here], and both companies have been removed from the registry (National Contractors Registry). Gil Rivas is also cited as Manager of ACBL in the Dominican Republic, which appears in the records as dissolved. Guzmán shows up as a partner/manager of Fluviomar Venezuela on another government site.

Interestingly, there is no record of Fluviomar in the Unique Taxpayer Key (CUIT) database of Argentina. However, there are two separate records related to Fluvialba: one from September 1994; and the second (related to FLUVIALBA – UNION TRANSITORIA DE EMPRESAS) from late July 2009.

According to leaked emails, Guzmán communicates with Julio de Vido through Oscar Alfredo Thomas. Check the image on the left. José María Olazagasti is Julio de Vido’s henchman. The sister’s partner of José María Olazagasti is Juan Zabaleta, Argentine Senate secretary and right-hand man of Amado Boudou, vice president of Argentina. Therefore, Guzmán lacks no connections in Buenos Aires. The fact that as soon as Lugo won the presidency of Paraguay, Guzmán’s companies’ involvement in Petropar shipments dramatically increased indicates that claims of his close connections with Lugo are credible. While the bilateral agreements between Cristina Kirchner and Hugo Chávez have been referred to as “the fraud of the century,” Guzmán’s name keeps resurfacing. Guzmán claims that the criticism of his contracts and relationships is a media campaign “pushed by those who lost business when Lugo was elected.”

How can a company that doesn’t seem to have ever paid taxes benefit from all these contracts? Who in Paraguay, Argentina, and Venezuela failed to conduct proper due diligence? How is it that a man on the brink of bankruptcy is allowed to engage in binational agreements worth hundreds of millions? How did his representations on behalf of MERCOSUR countries, despite holding no public office, not raise alarms? What role did Julio de Vido play in this? Did he receive commissions from Guzmán’s deals with Chávez? What about Olazagasti? And Kirchner, what does she have to say? Guzmán partnered with TANDANOR for a barge-building agreement with Venezuela; did he receive a kickback from that, or did he suffer after the exposure of the $800,000 that Chávez envoy Guido Antonini didn’t provide for re-election?

Guzmán is currently buying bankrupt companies in Venezuela. His accounts with U.S. companies are still pending. As long as the chavistas maintain power, his business will likely multiply. The same goes for Argentina, where his completely corrupt allies are in office or running for it. However, the small nation of Paraguay, by expelling Lugo and Guzmán, may have set a precedent among the bullying administrations of MERCOSUR countries on how to deal with such specimens.