The powerful Tareck El Aissami has been removed from power due to corruption investigations within Pdvsa.
On the night of Tuesday, March 21, the tranquility of the luxurious Country Club neighborhood in Caracas was disrupted by the presence of several Sebin vehicles—accompanied by drones—outside the Quinta Samán on Avenida El Samán.
The raid on the modern mansion, which spans 1,820 m2 and includes a guesthouse, a guard booth, meditation spaces, a pool, and a barbecue area, extended into the early morning hours. The property belongs to Alejandro Arroyo, one of the detainees accused of being a frontman and financial operator in the new illicit business scheme of PDVSA.
Quinta El Samán in the Country Club area of Caracas, owned by Alejandro Arroyo, one of the businessmen involved in the new corruption scheme of Pdvsa that led to Tareck El Aissami’s exit from the Ministry of Petroleum.
Through statements on their social media, the little-known National Anti-Corruption Police (PNAC) and the “Attorney General of the Republic” announced the dismantling of a corruption network within PDVSA, integrated by “officials who, taking advantage of their position and authority, allegedly executed parallel oil operations to PDVSA.”
Clearly, this situation indicates a new power struggle within the elite of the Maduro regime.
The initial estimate of the economic damage to the nation is about 3 billion dollars in accounts receivable, considered by investigators as “potentially unrecoverable, as they are linked to tankers that left the country without paying upfront, even though the clients had accepted these conditions.”
This was followed by a weekend filled with speculation, rumors, and uncertainty that peaked on Monday with Tareck El Aissami’s resignation from the Ministry of Petroleum. However, it wasn’t until Saturday, March 25, when Tarek William Saab communicated the official version regarding the new corruption scheme “discovered” in PDVSA (the 31st one, according to the prosecutor appointed by the official National Assembly). It was reminiscent of a similar case presented in August 2022, where Rafael Ramírez was held responsible for the embezzlement of 4.5 billion dollars through irregular operations with the exchange rate differential. In the current instance, Saab refrained from revealing the amount of the theft but named the alleged members of the scheme, identifying it as a “structure” whose “chief” would be Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Pérez Suárez, Vice President of Commerce and Supply of PDVSA.
Lt. Col. Antonio Pérez Suárez
As is his style, Saab used an agitated tone in his statement, filled with personal opinions, inaccuracies, and misplaced political and even philosophical comments to point out those implicated, ten officials and eleven businessmen detained in connection with the case:
Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Pérez Suárez, Vice President of Quality Commerce and Supply of PDVSA since February 2020, appointed by Nicolás Maduro.
Hugbel Roa, National Assembly deputy for PSUV. Former Minister of University Education, Science, and Technology, as well as former Deputy Minister of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic.
Former deputy Hugbel Roa (Psuv) with Maduro, Jorge Rodríguez, and Cilia Flores in Miraflores.
Joselitt Ramírez Camacho, the right-hand man of Tareck El Aissami, director of his office, and of the Superintendence of National Cryptocurrency (Sunacrip). He has a good relationship with the governor of Carabobo, Rafael Lacava. He is sanctioned by the U.S. which offers a reward of five million dollars for his capture.
Rajiv Alberto Mosqueda Fregona and Renny Gerardo Barrientos from the Digital Mining and Associated Processes Intendency.
Five officials from the Vice Presidency of Commerce and Supplies of PDVSA: José Agustín Ramos, Yamil Alejandro Martínez, Eduardo José Borgones, Henrys Chapellín, and Jesús Enrique Salazar.
José Mascimino Márquez García, Fourth Control Judge responsible for crimes associated with terrorism in the Judicial Criminal Circuit of the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, who was detained for favoring the impunity of the criminal band Tren del Llano. He would also be involved in the corruption schemes of PDVSA related to the exchange rate differential.
Former Superintendent of Cryptocurrency sought by US authorities
Regarding the businessmen involved, accused of being financial operators in the scheme, the prosecution confirmed the detention of:
Manuel Meneses Guevara, Roger Ramírez, the brothers Rafael and Roger Perdomo Rodríguez, Cristofer Barrios, Johana Torres, Alejandro Arroyo, Bernardo Arosio, Fernando Bermúdez, Leonardo Torres, and Daniel Prieto.
There are still eleven more who are wanted: the brothers Juan Manuel and Manuel Ramón Afonso López, William Rivas, Ximena Cagide Parada, Eduardo Noriega, José Luis Ferrandiz, Olvany Gaspari, Railin Elizabeth Yépez, Rodolfo Moleiro, Alejandro Londoño, and Yuravic Ravelo.
Rafael Perdomo Rodríguez and his brother Roger are businessmen close to Pérez Suárez.
All are accused of crimes of appropriation or diversion of public assets and money laundering.
Moreover, Saab announced the seizure of airplanes, yachts, motorcycles, houses, vehicles, and cash belonging to the criminal scheme. The question we ask ourselves is what will happen with those assets? Who will administer them? Who will manage them? The experience so far is that seized assets often end up in the hands of high-ranking officials within the regime. Furthermore, according to sources from Cuentas Claras Digital, there are reports of guarantees being made to return some of those confiscated assets to their owners in exchange for bribes.
It was notable that Saab did not mention Tareck El Aissami (TEA) throughout his intervention, despite having resigned from the Ministry of Petroleum to “collaborate with the investigation” on March 20, following a weekend purge of his associates. He was also not mentioned in the official National Assembly during the process of lifting parliamentary immunity of PSUV deputy Hugbel Roa.
Walid Mackled’s Confessions
“In a conversation we had in my apartment, he told me they needed to gather a certain amount of money because there was a banker who had collaborated with them with a thousand and something million bolívares, because they needed to buy an oil tanker to affiliate it with some friends of theirs.”
This is how Walid Makled, convicted for drug trafficking, describes the request made by Haisam El Aissami, brother of Tareck El Aissami (TEA), as he declared to NTN24 in 2010 during his detention in the high-security prison of Cónvita in Boyacá, Colombia. In the interview, he details the close relationship he maintained with TEA’s brother while he was serving as Minister of the Interior under Hugo Chávez.
Fourteen years ago, Tareck El Aissami was already focused on “oil business.”
The Arrests
The detention of Daniel Ricardo Prieto, accused of being a frontman for deputy Hugbel Roa, occurred after Venezuela alerted the authorities in the Dominican Republic, who proceeded to return or “inadmit” the financial operator who was traveling from Caracas to the Caribbean country.
Daniel R. Prieto Prieto, alleged frontman for deputy (PSUV) Hugbel Roa, was returned from the Dominican Republic at the request of Venezuela just as he was about to enter the Caribbean country.
Bernardo Arosio Hobaica, a construction businessman and owner of Prodata Energy, a company favored by PDVSA for exporting Venezuelan gas to Colombia, voluntarily presented himself to testify and was detained.
With better luck would have run Pedro Maldonado—a trusted man of Tareck El Aissami and partner of Alejandro Arroyo—the president of the Venezuelan Corporation of Guyana (CVG), who, after having collaborated with investigators, would have been released.
Another relevant collaborator would be Major of the GNB Manuel Parra Ramírez, who was recently a member of Pérez Suárez’s team, who fired him from the Vice Presidency of Commerce and Supply.
The businessman Daniel David Uzcátegui was presented to testify under the custody of the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM).
Since the National Anti-Corruption Police—this largely unknown entity—affiliated with the Sebin, announced the investigation confirmed later by the Public Ministry, many names of potential involved parties have circulated in media and social networks, some of which were not confirmed by Tarek Saab.
These include: Army Colonel Oscar Dávila Rondón, who has held important positions such as the presidency of Bariven and PDVSA Industrial. From the trusted team of Antonio Pérez Suárez, he accompanied him in the Socialist Corporation of Cement and in the Automotive Sector; general manager of PDV Marina, Colonel Samuel Testamarck; Lieutenant Colonel José Agustín Ramos Chirinos, general manager of the Comprehensive Security Division of the Orinoco Oil Belt, and the former governor of Sucre state, Edwin Rojas.
On the early morning of this Sunday, social media circulated reports of the National Anti-Corruption Police raiding several apartments in a building in the Los Chorros neighborhood of Caracas, supposedly owned by Jesús Méndez, known as El Gordo, a personal friend of Tareck El Aissami.
To my brother and comrade the fat MÉNDEZ who today reaches his half-century of life. Happy birthday!! Many blessings!!
— Tareck El Aissami (@TareckPSUV) November 23, 2014
The Accusations and the Figures
Both the officials and the businessmen being investigated have been accused by the MP of appropriation or diversion of public assets and money laundering. In his speech, Saab did not confirm the initial figure of 3 billion dollars, nor did he deny or confirm the amounts of the looting that have circulated in the media and social networks.
The international news agency Reuters asserts that PDVSA may have accumulated 21.2 billion dollars in accounts receivable, equivalent to 84% of the total value of billed shipments—three times this year’s fiscal budget—after resorting to dozens of intermediaries since 2020 to export oil under the sanctions regime.
Thus, PDVSA has relinquished its exclusive role in oil sales, handing over this power to third parties, most of which are shell companies of businessmen aligned with Chavismo, who have no expertise in the oil sector and have exploited the “improvisation,” disorder, and secrecy provided by the Anti-Blockade Law enacted on October 12, 2020, especially through articles 36, 37, and 38.
According to figures provided by the portal ArmandoInfo, the deficit in PDVSA’s finances would be over 8 billion dollars, due to the debts of these companies accumulated over the past four years.
Modus Operandi
The sale of crude oil is conducted through a method known as “compensation,” which is simply a barter of oil for food or the construction of public works, among other state needs. The transactions involve discounts of up to 40%, citing risks from sanctions.
In some cases, the operation is finalized with upfront payments where the buyer can inspect the product, based on which prices and commissions are negotiated.
In the midst of a lack of controls and opacity, and to evade sanctions, experts indicate that it is a common practice for vessels loaded with Venezuelan oil—often rented tankers since those from PDV Marina are inoperative or do not dare to leave for fear of seizures due to the oil company’s debts—and whose tracking or AIS systems have been disabled, to transship the cargo (lightering) at sea to international traders who then resell it to oil companies in countries like China or India, among others.
What complicates these transactions is performing payments without using the international banking system and without guarantees from insurance and reinsurance companies. How does PDVSA get paid and how do operators manage to receive payments when they take risks, both in buying and selling oil and in financial transactions?
The arrest of Joselitt Ramírez Camacho, director of the National Superintendency of Cryptocurrency (Sunacrip), would confirm the use of cryptocurrencies in PDVSA’s financial transactions.
Corruption Clans: Heads and Members
The “red-red” destruction of PDVSA seized by the kleptocracy and kakistocracy of Miraflores becomes evident once again with the sale of oil through mechanisms of absolute opacity, with a predominance of the illegal, and with absolute non-compliance with the standards that have always characterized the oil company as an exemplary enterprise in the past. The clans divided what was left of the oil pie.
The office of Lieutenant Colonel Pérez Suárez must have the record of orders received from various sectors of the Madurist elite requesting their share of crude that PDVSA dispatched without any control or transparency.
From Miraflores, Maduro surely recommended Alex Saab and Alvaro Pulido to receive oil in exchange for food, among other illicit activities.
Carlos Erik Malpica Flores, nephew of Cilia Flores and former Vice President of Finance of PDVSA, involved in illicit businesses concerning the exchange rate differential, has also received his share of oil through his operator Ramón Carretero Napolitano. Furthermore, Cilia Flores’ sons haven’t fallen behind. They are reportedly operating with Francisco Convit, Nicolás Caleya, Alejandro Ceballos (alias el Nené), and brothers Santiago and Ricardo Morón Hernández.
The vice president and minister of finance, Delcy Rodríguez, has one of her quotas allocated to Jorge Giménez, president of the Venezuelan Football Federation, who was implicated in a media investigation in 2022 of being the head, along with Alejandro Arroyo Pérez and Gilber Renee Mejias, of ENSA Energía AG and Logística y Alimentos El Mazo C.A., companies managing the oil-for-food exchange structure of PDVSA that supplies the CLAP, following the detention in 2020 of Alex Saab. Giménez operates in the oil business alongside his partner Antonio González and his brothers. Similarly, the connections between Delcy and brothers Majed and Khaled Khalil Majzoub are public knowledge. They have engaged in multiple businesses with the state and now also sell oil. Questions arise regarding their payment of bills to PDVSA.
Majed and Khaled Khalil Majzoub, associates of Delcy Rodríguez, have been privileged contractors of Chavismo.
As for Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Pérez Suárez, accused of being the head of the scheme, he is linked to his friend Dr. Eduardo Meneses and brothers Rafael and Roger Perdomo Rodríguez, contractors with significant projects such as the Oriente Highway, financed by oil sales.
The brothers Bernardo and Tadeo Arosio Hobaica from ATB Constructores, businessmen in the tourism sector with hotels and inns in Los Roques, La Tortuga, and Galipán, are seen as a quota of Tareck El Aissami that has favored them with gas sales to Colombia.
Maduro is Responsible
Corruption in PDVSA is not new. In the books Estado Delincuente (2013) and El Gran Saqueo (2015) by Carlos Tablante and Marcos Tarre, the schemes described, which according to Tarek William Saab now exceed 30, are identified as “systemic corruption.” By confession of parts, release of evidence.
This is what the authors asked Asdrúbal Chávez, who controlled trade and supplies at the oil company at the time, in the book Estado Delincuente (p. 187):
“Who are the traders or operators of these transactions? Who are the clients? How much and how do they pay? At what prices? What are the details of the transactions with Cuba and China? In the case of Cuba, oil was sold and payment was made through advice and social work. However, later, in a triangulation, Cuba sold the crude to third parties. Are commissions managed? Who received them?”
There was no blockade, but these questions were already more than relevant a decade ago. Now more than ever, when the kleptocracy has definitively taken over PDVSA. Evidence of this is what has happened with its last presidents: Rafael Ramírez, with an arrest warrant. Nelson Martínez died in prison. Eulogio del Pino has been imprisoned for six years. Manuel Quevedo, who in 2017 ordered an audit that resulted in 65 managers being detained for the illegal sale of hydrocarbons, is sanctioned for corruption by the U.S. and Canada. Tareck El Aissami, under fire amid a new corruption scandal, and Asdrúbal Chávez, who quietly passes by despite the power and responsibility he has held in PDVSA for years.
In a country where an autocrat has destroyed democratic institutions, he controls all power and therefore, whoever has more power bears greater responsibility in the grand looting that Venezuela, and especially PDVSA, has suffered.
In a country with the rule of law and democracy, the president, as the head of public finances, should receive daily reports on how many barrels of oil are being produced, who they are sold to, and at what prices. Similarly, the vice president and minister of finance should know the financial availability for budget execution. For his part, the Minister of Petroleum should also have detailed information on PDVSA’s operations, subordinate to his office. The duty of the president of PDVSA, who until December was Asdrúbal Chávez and now is Pedro Tellechea, is to be informed about all activities carried out under the strict safety regulations necessary for an efficient operation of the oil company according to international standards. It’s worth remembering that in the old PDVSA, the General Comptroller of the Nation had an office at the main headquarters of the oil company.
Finally, if serious crimes against PDVSA’s assets have been committed, as is evident, the main responsible party, who must explain to the nation, is the autocrat Nicolás Maduro.
Note: In a forthcoming installment, we will delve into the routes of the vessels, as well as the financial aspects (cryptocurrencies, insurance, and banks) of the current scheme.