What exactly are Russian military contingents doing in Venezuela? Nicolás Maduro justifies the situation with unfounded claims about U.S. plans to assassinate him, adding that these are “technical teams” deployed to “provide advice and service equipment.” Reports of Russian soldiers’ presence in remote gold-producing areas of Bolívar state, hundreds of miles from Maduro’s stronghold, surfaced some time ago. Recent reports indicate that Russian military personnel have been sighted in Coloncito, a city in Táchira state near the border region between Colombia and Venezuela, on the opposite end of the previous reports. The Russians are allegedly installing radars and overseeing air defense and telecommunications systems acquired by Chavismo in the past. This unprecedented buildup of Russian soldiers is scarcely mentioned in the current debate. Earlier rumors pointed to the presence of a contingent of mercenaries from the Wagner Group, yet no evidence or confirmation has emerged.
Maduro, like his predecessor, has the fantasy that the “Empire” wants him dead. It’s a page from Fidel Castro‘s playbook. Maduro is certainly not Soleimani, making it really difficult for a “revolutionary” like him to accept that the U.S. government couldn’t care less and restricts its actions purely to administrative measures, such as randomly implemented sanctions.
Russia, on the other hand, is filling the void, laughing all the way to the bank while establishing a beachhead just a couple of hours flight from Miami.
No one can criticize the opportunism of Vladimir Putin or Maduro’s ability to capitalize on the supposed aggression from Donald Trump. A tangible result of U.S. policy toward Venezuela is the increasing military presence and economic participation from Russia. While federal agencies hesitate about cutting PDVSA, Chavismo, and the boliburguesía out of the business, Putin has decisively placed the resources of the Russian state at Maduro’s service.
Rosneft has rapidly become the largest player in the Venezuelan oil sector. Its influence over all energy-related matters in Venezuela will only increase. Evrofinance Mosnarbank, sanctions and all, continues to flaunt the sanctions regime. Today, receivables are settled through internal transfers—keep in mind that FONDEN holds a majority stake—and from there, funds flow into Russia’s banking system. There is absolutely nothing the Treasury can do to force Maduro to demand contractors and creditors travel to Moscow if they wish to get paid.
Gazprom, Gazprombank, and VTB Bank, although part of the sanctions regime related to Ukraine, also mock the Treasury. No secondary sanctions have been imposed on any related party. The oligarchs assisting Maduro in retaining power are operating in Russia with the same ease as they did in the United States.
Additionally, there are FSB operatives seeking to sell Venezuelan crude. It bears repeating: Lavrov knows far better than Pompeo what is happening in Venezuela, as he has a thorough understanding of the oil operations. Russian partners like Alejandro Betancourt and company not only provide insights into Venezuelan politics but it is quite safe to assume that their employee Rudy Giuliani also keeps him updated on events in the United States. It would be foolish to believe otherwise.
Little is known about how, if at all, the Trump administration is handling the Russia/Putin factor in Venezuela. However, what is clear from other perspectives is that Putin will not relinquish his position without getting his pound of flesh. In all this, Juan Guaidó seems to be less than an afterthought; his “U.S. Ambassador” has not even spoken with the Russians.