Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has led to an unprecedented series of measures: Switzerland is set to consider freezing Russian assets; Turkey is contemplating closing the Istanbul Strait to the Russian navy; Germany has announced the creation of a defense fund with an initial total of 100 billion euros, which will be replenished annually with 2% of Germany’s GDP; many European countries are sending weapons and resources to thwart Putin’s success; the EU has closed its airspace to all aircraft owned, registered, and operated by Russians, and for the first time, it will fund the purchase and delivery of weapons to a friendly European nation (Ukraine); all of Europe wants to join NATO now.
In addition to these measures, Russia has been subjected to various economic sanctions. High-profile names in the oligarch world are expected to be impacted for the first time. It is crucial to target their subordinates as well. All owners, board members, shareholders of any Russian entities operating internationally, or any foreign-owned or controlled company connected with Russia must be sanctioned—not just well-known CEOs.
Discreet individuals such as Boris Ivanov, Vladimir Shvarts, Sergey Tagashov, Ivan Zudenkov, and Vladimir Anisimov should be on all sanction lists. Their non-Russian partners, associates, propagandists, and lobbyists should receive the same treatment. No one should be allowed to move freely in the Western world while lavishly spending ill-gotten gains. No one should be permitted to continue carrying out Putin’s orders. No one should be allowed to use courts in the Western world.
As part of the international sanctions against Russia and Vladimir Putin, the U.S., the U.K., the European Union, and the G7 must particularly target these enablers and facilitators—the cogs that keep Kremlin criminality running smoothly. These representatives may not be as well-known compared to Roman Abramovich, Oleg Deripaska, or Mikhail Prokhorov. However, they are essential to ensuring Putin’s global destabilization plans and reside in many Western countries as respected members of society.
Banks, wealth managers, law firms, public relations firms, and transportation and insurance companies involved with Russian parties should face secondary sanctions, as none can provide proof of the legitimate origin of funds. Everything has been pillaged.
Rosneft and Gazprom have long been operating in Venezuela. Before the series of sanctions from the Treasury Department of the Trump administration against Nicolás Maduro’s regime and against PDVSA, executives of those companies had very fluid relations at the highest levels of power in Venezuela. This remains the case, and Russia has been crucial in assisting Maduro with the technical know-how to circumvent Treasury sanctions, but once the sanctions were announced, they devised a “withdrawal.”
Rosneft claimed it was selling its assets in Venezuela. This façade of a sale was typical of Putin: a simple parking of assets into another vehicle controlled by the Kremlin (Roszarubezhneft). Far from being an exception, Russia has a pattern when it comes to asset disposals to evade sanctions. A Russian-Venezuelan joint venture named Evrofinance Mosnarbank—formed by VTB, Gazprombank, and FONDEN (National Development Fund of Venezuela, which owns 49.9%)—did something similar: VTB and Gazprombank transferred their stakes to Rosimushchestvo (Federal Agency for State Property Management). For free, like Rosneft.
This formula is popular.
Rosneft still holds 49.9% of CITGO, the Venezuelan refinery in the U.S. This stake has become fair game for asset freezes backed by the Treasury against Kremlin-controlled companies.
Sweden should finally examine what’s happening in Nynas and investigate the Russian involvement in the company (GPB Global Resources). When Treasury sanctions hit Nynas, a reorganization was announced. PDVSA, which owned 50.1%, “derogated” 35% of its shares to a foundation controlled by Nynas management and allowed Russian executives from GPB Global Resources to appoint legal advisors on behalf of PDVSA.
The seriousness of GPB in the reorganization process of Nynas stemmed from the acquisition of Venezuelan crude (Petrozamora), the accumulated debt, and loans, none of which justified PDVSA’s relinquishment of its authority and position during the restructuring.