At least a hundred individuals identified as “bandits” or “armed gangsters” were killed in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, during recent police operations that utilized kamikaze drones. The raids occurred between June 9 and June 11, 2025.
According to Pierre Espérance, Executive Director of the National Network for Human Rights Defense (RNDDH), who provided this assessment on the “Parenthèse” show on Radio RFM, at least 16 kamikaze drones were deployed. The attacks targeted gang strongholds in Grand-Ravine and Village de Dieu, located in the third district of the Haitian capital. These areas are controlled by gang leaders Renel Destina, known as “Ti Lapli,” and Johnson André, alias “Izo.” Similar operations have also been reported in Bel’Air, Bas-Delmas, and Torcelle.
The uniqueness of these operations lies in the unusual official communication. While the Haitian police rarely issue statements regarding interventions of this magnitude, Pierre Espérance from RNDDH is often the first to provide a report on the events. However, the figures he presents have raised questions among the public regarding their origin and the methods used for data collection. When questioned by journalists from the program “Premye Okazyon,” Espérance declined to reveal his methods for obtaining information publicly.
The situation in Haiti remains volatile, with growing concerns about security in Port-au-Prince, where armed gangs maintain a strong hold. The use of kamikaze drones in these operations marks an escalation in the methods employed to combat these armed groups.
New Insights from an Additional Report (World Politics Review)
A report by James Bosworth, recently published, offers further insights into the use of drones against gangs in Haiti:
* In the first five months of 2025, a special police force in Haiti, reportedly supported by private military contractors, has used small commercial drones equipped with improvised explosives.
* Several hundred people are reported to have died in these drone strikes.
* Despite the operations, the police have yet to neutralize any of the major gang leaders, which was one of their stated goals.
* Haitian gangs currently control most of the country.
* The drone attacks have been tactically imprecise, and it is unclear how many gang members have died compared to civilians.
* A gang leader published a video on social media mocking the government for not having reached him in an attack.
* The strategy of eliminating “high-value targets” (HVTs) does not always work and can have counterproductive effects, such as fragmenting criminal groups, leading to more violence.
* There are concerns that gangs may acquire drone technology and explosives available on the market to counter the government’s offensive.
* Haitian governmental forces would be more vulnerbale to this type of drone warfare due to their fixed assets and lack of anti-drone options.
* It is argued that killing gang leadership has little meaning if there is no Haitian state capable of filling the void left if the gangs are defeated.
* The multinational force aimed at helping to secure Haiti still lacks sufficient funding and personnel.
* The Haitian government lacks resources to provide its population with basic services like food, housing, education, and healthcare.
* The use of drones is seen as a sign of the weakness of the Haitian government, rather than its strength, being an economical and asymmetric option that could disrupt gang command for a few weeks.
* Choosing to bomb targets with drones, as it is cheaper than funding necessary state capacity to rebuild Haiti, is viewed as a “dystopian version of 21st-century counterinsurgency warfare doomed to fail.”
