The intensification of evasion mechanisms to dodge sanctions under Nicolás Maduro’s regime will be the response to the end of General License 41B from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which allowed Chevron Corporation to carry out certain operations in Venezuela.
While the existence of this concession does not imply a lack of response from Maduro’s tyranny to sanctions during its validity, it is expected that efforts to finance the Venezuelan dictatorship will increase. This is evidenced by the revelation from Spanish businessman Alejandro Hamlyn regarding a joint hydrocarbon company based in Geneva (Switzerland), allegedly co-owned by Delcy Rodríguez and Víctor Aldama.
National and foreign companies will take over —as occurred during Donald Trump’s first administration— the operation of oil and gas fields. However, this time, it will not be an easy task, especially since the U.S. government is already aware of this situation and will likely implement strong measures in response.
The Sanction Evasion Mechanism
As mentioned, both national and foreign companies will be masked to take over the operations of oil and gas fields that will be deactivated due to OFAC licenses. Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and Maduro’s regime will handpick these (fields), and the companies will charge for their services through allocations of crude oil and refined products.
Consequently, these companies will be the focus of U.S. government attention, particularly shipping companies that have previously supported the Chavista dictatorship. The secondary sanctions, with tariffs of 25% imposed by Trump on companies purchasing Venezuelan crude oil, will undoubtedly serve as a warning for these firms.
It should also be noted that the companies to which Nicolás Maduro will assign the fields will most likely lack the financial, logistical, and technical structures for this purpose. Therefore, the country will face a new scenario of “scraping the pot” rather than genuine oil operations.
The Operations
Sources from Venezuela Política explain that oil fields producing light crude (API between 31.1° and 39°) will be prioritized since this type of crude needs to be used in place of the diluents supplied by Chevron. Producing this crude is more expensive, but it will be necessary to blend with heavy (API between 21.9° and 10°) and extra-heavy (API less than 10°) crudes from the Orinoco Oil Belt. Production in the FPO is cheaper (USD/bbl) than in traditional light crude areas.
Additionally, the regime must effectively address all mechanisms that the United States implements to halt the sale of crude in the black market by Venezuela. Otherwise, Nicolás Maduro will simply proceed to drain the meager resources obtained, leaving the population in absolute misery. The excuse will always be the same: “it’s the sanctions’ fault.”
If the regime fails in its black market sales, the consequences will be overflowing storage tanks, both in operational areas and in crude loading and dispatch terminals.
The Company of Delcy Rodríguez and Aldama
A note from Spanish media The Objetive revealed a recording in which the president of Grupo Hafesa, Alejandro Hamlyn, claims that Venezuela’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, co-owns with Víctor Aldama —one of the figures in the Delcygate scandal— a venture that transports oil from Venezuela to Spain before selling it in the Dominican Republic.
This is merely one of the mechanisms that Maduro’s regime uses to finance itself. The aggravating factor here, apart from evading sanctions, is that it reveals a new instance of Chavista corruption.
The company —in which a nephew allegedly serves as a front for Rodríguez— uses “ship to ship operation (cargo transfer between two ships) in which the origin of the merchandise was changed” to transport hydrocarbons “by ship to the waters of Algeciras (Spain).”
They negotiate with fuel sold through companies that alter the “papers for Curacao [the Caribbean island]. I also have those. The ship arrived [in Algeciras] and a ship to ship [transfer] was made. I have the ships, I have everything,” Hamlyn explains in the recording played in Spanish media.
Further, he describes the operation: “That [the hydrocarbon] goes directly to the shipping companies. The problem is that you are talking about a product, the fuel oil, that costs $30 per barrel compared to $100 here. We are talking about massive evasion. These are other markets, especially given American sanctions. When Venezuelan products were extremely cheap, it was due to American sanctions. You can only work with their license.”
He continues: “In this case, what they’ve done is smuggling and brought the product to a company that is a friend of mine, by the way, who had it on credit. This one would fill tanks with another origin and sell it in bunkering [selling fuel tax-free to refill boats or tankers in the port]. That is what they have been doing. That’s where they made big money. And the company doing this is owned by the country’s vice president (Delcy Rodríguez), who has her nephew as a frontman.” He adds: “what the press has published about Aldama are just a few companies; he has many more.”
The Ghost Ships
A fleet of ghost ships is also part of the strategy used to evade sanctions by Nicolás Maduro’s regime.
A fleet of ghost ships is also part of the strategy used to evade sanctions by Nicolás Maduro’s regime. A note from Bloomberg describes how thousands of tankers are used to transport Venezuelan oil under sanctions —the same occurs with oil from Iran and Russia—to bypass these sanctions.
It’s a fleet that takes on the identities of scrapped tankers to simulate legitimacy, thereby evading scrutiny from the U.S. and other countries.
Bloomberg reports that in the last four weeks, at least four ghost or zombie ships have operated with Venezuelan crude since Trump imposed massive tariffs on countries trading oil with Venezuela.
These ships were identified through data tracking by Starboard Maritime Intelligence, as well as satellite images of the waters off the oil terminals of Amuay (Falcón) and José (Anzoátegui). By comparing the images, identity theft of the vessels can be established.
Investigations have identified the ship M Sophia, built in 2004, which assumed the identity of the Varada —the real one would be 32 years old but was dismantled in Bangladesh in 2017. Another was the Gema, built in 1999, and the Alana built in 1998, which have sailed from Amuay loaded with crude to bypass Cape of Good Hope and head for the Indian Ocean.
The report notes that China is the primary buyer of Venezuelan crude, indicating that in March, ten ships delivered 461,000 barrels per day to Chinese processors, according to U.S. customs and shipping companies.
Check out in Sin Filtros “State Terrorism in Venezuela: The Guanipa Case and the 70 Prisoners”: